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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Kingdom of Belgium is a country in northwest Europe.  It is a 
founding member of the European Union and hosts its headquarters,
1
 as well 
as those of other major international organizations, including the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
2
  Belgium covers an area of 11,787 
square miles (30,528 square kilometers) and has a population of about 10.6 
million people.
3
  Straddling the cultural boundary between Germanic and 
Latin Europe, Belgium is home to two main linguistic groups: the Dutch-
speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons.  In addition, Belgium is 
home to a small group of German speakers.
4
  Belgium’s two largest regions 
are the Dutch-speaking
5
 region of Flanders in the north, with 58% of the 
population, and the French-speaking southern region of Wallonia, inhabited 
by 32% of the population.
6
  The Brussels–Capital Region, home to 
approximately 10% of the population, is officially bilingual.
7
  The area is 
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1. KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
416 (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
2. NATO HANDBOOK 219 (2001). 
3. Country Profile: Belgium, BBC News, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/999709.stm. 
4. Id.  In one small area of Belgium, the East Canton region obtained from Germany after 
World War I, German is the principal language of about 70,000 Belgians.  Id. 
5. The official language spoken in Flanders is now standard Dutch, not a separate Flemish 
dialect, although several local dialects still exist.  See KENNETH D. MCRAE, CONFLICT AND 
COMPROMISE IN MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES: BELGIUM 56–59 (1986).  
6. Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center, in FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL 
CLEAVAGES 55, 56 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004). 
7. Id. 
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primarily French-speaking (85%
8
) and is located within the Flemish region 
but near the Walloon region. 
Early in the twentieth century, King Albert I was told by a Walloon 
political leader, ―Sire, there are no Belgians anymore, only Flemings and 
Walloons.‖9  The Belgian conflict between the Flemish North and the 
Francophone South is a typical multi-issue conflict that combines issues of 
history, culture, and identity, with strong economic dimensions.  The conflict 
has a long history: ―The heat of the discussions in the media, parliament and 
public opinion led foreign observers to believe that the country was about to 
fall apart.‖10  This quote fits the present situation very well, yet it was written 
more than a century ago, before World War I.
11
 
In this Article, we analyze the ongoing conflict in Belgium.  Our focus is 
on the actual role of the media and possible attitudes and contributions of the 
media to this particular conflict.  In Part II, we first analyze the different 
factors contributing to the division in Belgium.  We then explore the role of 
the media in this conflict in Part III.  In Part IV we examine the media’s use of 
different styles and metaphors and their negative or positive impact on the 
conflict.  In particular, we look at surrealism, supposedly typical for Belgium, 
and the use of humor.  We also suggest a model to frame different approaches.  
We conclude with some suggestions for a more positive role of the media, 
applying our model for de-escalation of conflicts. 
II.  BELGIUM, A DIVIDED COUNTRY
12
 
A.  History 
The conflict between the Flemish- and French-speaking communities 
within Belgium has deep historical roots, going back to the seventeenth-
century liberation war of the so-called ―Low Countries‖ from the Spanish 
rulers at that time.  In the northern part of the territory that now makes up 
Belgium, people spoke various Dutch-German dialects, except a small 
French-speaking bourgeois elite.  In the southern part of what is now 
Belgium, French was the common language.  As a result of the French 
 
8. Kris Deschouwer, Kingdom of Belgium, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND 
CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 48, 51 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005). 
9. Id. at 50. 
10. See Jeroen van der Kris, Belgium—A Praline Marriage, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE 
WITHOUT A UNIFIED PUBLIC OPINION? THE SWISS EXPERIENCE AND THE BELGIAN CASE 50, 50 
(Dave Sinardet & Marc Hooghe eds., 2009) [hereinafter IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE]. 
11. See id. 
12. For a more detailed discussion of the cultural divide in Belgium, see Robert Mnookin & 
Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No Reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in 
Belgium, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (2009). 
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Revolution, the whole country became a province of France.
13
  After the fall 
of Napoleon in 1815, what is now Belgium became the southern part of the 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands, ruled by King William I.
14
  Soon a 
surprising coalition emerged, with deep resentment of Dutch rule.  The liberal 
bourgeoisie and Francophone aristocracy resented the use of the Dutch 
language and ―foreign control.‖  The Catholic Church, especially influential in 
Flanders, was suspicious of the Netherlands because it was seen as a 
Protestant state. 
In 1830, this coalition led a revolt against Dutch rule.  In 1831, the 
Belgian National Congress (dominated by the Francophone bourgeoisie, 
consisting of Walloons and the Flemish elite) wrote a liberal constitution and 
created a unitary parliamentary state with a constitutional monarch.
15
  
Although the majority of the population has always been Flemish,
16
 
Francophone Belgians have dominated the country politically, economically, 
and culturally since the very beginning. 
B.  Language and Cultural Divide 
In the new country, French was to be the exclusive and single language.
17
  
Initially, the Dutch language was suppressed in all public administration and 
in state-sponsored education.  There was a systemic social and economic 
discrimination against those who spoke Dutch.  The Flemish majority were 
treated as inferior peasants.
18
 Flemish who wanted to advance in society 
learned French, and many Flemish bourgeois families spoke French at 
home.
19
  Few Walloons ever bothered to learn Dutch.
20
  By the end of the 
 
13. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 14.  
14. Id.  
15. Id.  The Belgian Constitution was arguably the most liberal in Europe at the time.  It 
recognized fundamental freedoms relating to speech, press, religion, education, assembly, and 
languages, and also included provisions relating to the separation of powers.  See generally BELG. 
CONST. arts. 8–41. 
16. There were 2.4 million Dutch speakers and 1.8 million French speakers in 1846.  André 
Alen, Nationalism–Federalism–Democracy: The Example of Belgium, 5 EUR. REV. PUBL. L. 41, 45 
n.24 (1993).  
17. See Deschouwer, supra note 8, at 49.  But see MCRAE, supra note 5, at 22.  McRae 
translates the article in the original constitution as follows: ―The use of the languages spoken in 
Belgium is optional (facultatif).  It can be regulated only by law, and only concerning official acts 
and judicial matters.‖  However, the Law of 19 September 1831 declared French to be the only 
official language for the proclamation of laws and resolutions.  See ANDRÉ ALEN & KOEN MUYLLE, 
COMPENDIUM VAN HET BELGISCH STAATSRECHT § 383 (2008).  
18. See Luc Huyse, Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium, in CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE 
IN BELGIUM: THE DYNAMICS OF A CULTURALLY DIVIDED SOCIETY 107, 109–10 (Arend Lijphart 
ed., 1981).  
19. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 39–40 (referring to a ―domestic colonialism‖ and stating that 
―[t]his socioeconomic dimension of the linguistic boundary within the Flemish region has . . . 
heightened linguistic tensions‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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nineteenth century, a Flemish movement striving for language and culture 
rights emerged and achieved some success with language laws.
21
  The 1898 
―Law of Equality‖ recognized both languages in official documents,22 and a 
1921 law contemplated that municipal officials might be bilingual.
23
  
However, in practice the country remained largely Francophone.
24
 
Turning points occurred in 1932 and 1935, when two monolingual regions 
were created on the basis of a territorial line dividing the country into two 
parts.
25
  The use of language in administrative matters, primary and secondary 
education, and judicial matters was to be based exclusively on location—not 
the mother tongue of the individual citizen.  In Flanders, Dutch became the 
only official language, and in the Walloon region, the official language was 
exclusively French. Brussels and certain border areas were said to be 
bilingual.  With the exception of Brussels, the national language policy 
essentially became one of dual monolinguism, based on the principle of 
territorial location, not bilingualism, with language rights attaching to 
individuals.
26
 
Particularly, both World Wars have left deep scars in Belgian society.  
Large battlefields serve to remind Belgians of the countless deaths in World 
War I.  The story goes that French-speaking officers refused to speak Flemish, 
and for this reason many Flemish soldiers died.  The IJzerbedevaart 
(Pilgrimage of the Yser) is a yearly gathering of Flemish in honor of those 
soldiers.  The gathering also serves as a political meeting of individuals who 
are striving for Flemish political autonomy.  Even more delicate and at the 
core of the conflict is the collaboration issue of World War II.  Numerous 
Flemish who culturally sympathized with the Nazis were sentenced to death, 
while economic collaboration in the south remained largely unpunished.
27
 
 
20. This asymmetry persists.  See Victor Ginsburgh & Shlomo Weber, La dynamique des 
Langues en Belgique [The Dynamics of Languages in Belgium], 42 REGARDS ECONOMIQUES 1, 4 
(2006). 
21. There is vast literature on the Flemish movement.  See generally THE FLEMISH 
MOVEMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: 1780–1990 (Theo Hermans, Louis Vos & Lode Wils eds., 
1992); François Nielsen, The Flemish Movement in Belgium After World War II: A Dynamic 
Analysis, 45 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 76 (1980). 
22. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 17, § 266. 
23. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150. 
24. See id. 
25. Dave Sinardet, Territorialité et identités linguistiques en Belgique [Territoriality and 
Linguistic Identities in Belgium], 51 HERMÈS 141, 144 (2008). 
26. The language frontier became firm and final with the Language Act of 8 November 1962.  
ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 17, § 271; MCRAE, supra note 5, at 152–56. 
27. ANDRÉ DE VRIES, FLANDERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY 21–22 (2007). 
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C.  Economic Divide 
From the outset, the Walloon region economically dominated the new 
nation.  With large coal reserves, this region was among the earliest in Europe 
to industrialize, and it experienced rapid economic growth during the 
nineteenth century.
28
  Flanders, on the other hand, relied on subsistence 
agriculture. Crop failures led to a famine and contributed to massive 
unemployment and severe economic hardship.
29
 
For more than a century, the Walloons remained economically dominant, 
but World War II brought a turning point.  The coal and steel industries in 
Wallonia started to decline.  Over the years, many jobs were lost and there 
was little foreign investment.  In the meantime, Flanders enjoyed a period of 
industrial modernization.  The Flemish port of Antwerp prospered, and new 
plants were built for thriving industries, such as car assembly and 
shipbuilding.  Flanders attracted substantial foreign investment.
30
  By the mid-
1960s, the Flemish gross regional product per capita surpassed that of 
Wallonia.
31
  Today, the Flemish region of the country is substantially richer 
than the Walloon region.  The Flemish gross domestic product per capita 
exceeds that of Germany and France, and nearly equals that of the United 
Kingdom.
32
  The Walloon GDP, on the other hand, is similar to the poorest 
regions in France and Italy.
33
 
D.  Social Divide 
These differences have resulted in a social divide in a country that in fact 
harbors two nations.  A Belgian identity, if not entirely valueless,
34
 certainly 
does not count for much. For many, their Belgian identity is thin, at least in 
comparison to their local or regional identity.
35
  However, identity discussions 
 
28. REFLECTION GROUP ―IN DE WARANDE,‖ MANIFESTO FOR AN AUTONOMOUS FLANDERS 
WITHIN EUROPE 51 (English ed. 2006) [hereinafter MANIFESTO]. 
29. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 23–24.   
30. MANIFESTO, supra note 28, at 51–53.  
31. Hooghe, supra note 6, at 57. 
32. Press Release, Eurostat, Regional GDP Per Inhabitant in the EU27 (Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/09/23&format=PDF&aged=O& 
language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  In 2006, Flanders’s per capita GDP was 118% of the EU27 
average, while the Walloon region’s was only 85%.  Id. 
33. Id.; Ludo Beheydt, The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium, in LANGUAGES IN 
CONTACT AND CONFLICT: CONTRASTING EXPERIENCES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM 48, 
53–54 (Sue Wright & Helen Kelly eds., 1995).  
34. See Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, ―Will It Stay or Will It Go?‖ Federalism and 
the Sustainability of Belgium, 29 W. EUR. POL. 877, 889 (2006) (―[T]he younger [Flemish] are more 
willing to identify with Belgium, possibly because they lack first-hand experience with linguistic 
discrimination.‖).  
35. Hooghe, supra note 6, at 65.  One research report indicates that less than half of the 
Flemish feel simultaneously Flemish and Belgian; the other half feel more exclusively Belgian than 
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are tricky.  Identity is a complex and multilayered concept and includes 
numerous distinct feelings.
36
  Like all social phenomena, it relates to multiple 
factors that may vary historically, culturally, and sociologically.
37
  
Undoubtedly, political and media discourse play important roles in the 
creation of the identity construct.
38
 
There are quite contrasting views on the degree to which Flanders and 
Wallonia differ in their identity or share a common identity.  One view is that 
there are substantial cultural differences between the Flemish and the 
Walloons.  This view is represented by stereotypes such as that the Flemish 
are disciplined and hard-working like the northern European Germanic 
cultures, while the Walloons take after the more fun-loving Latins in southern 
Europe.
39
  Ideological differences follow the linguistic lines: the socialist 
tradition is stronger in the Walloon region, and the Flemish are much more 
committed to a market economy.
40
  Flanders has a higher proportion of 
observant Catholics than the more secular Walloon region.
41
  It has been 
argued that these differences have been embedded in a historical perspective 
since the origin of the country.  Examples cited are the different electoral 
behavior since the 1880s,
42
 the dissimilarity in public opinion regarding the 
 
exclusively Flemish.  Dave Sinardet, Politiek en pers in de Belgische communautaire maalstroom: 
samenleven onder een lekkend dak, in MÉNAGE À TROIS: QUO VADIS BELGICA 237, 245 (Carl Devos 
ed. 2006) [hereinafter Sinardet 2006].  Yet another research report indicates that the Flemish feel 
very positive toward Wallonia and identify mostly with their Belgian nationality.  Dave Sinardet, 
Televisie zonder grenzen? De beeldbuis in Tijden van regionalisme en globalisering, SAMENLEVING 
EN POLITIEK, Feb. 2001, at 35, 39. [hereinafter Sinardet 2001].  In the same paragraph, the author 
refers to the latest European value research indicating that Flemish more easily identify with Flanders 
than Walloons with Wallonia, but therefore do not feel less Belgian.  Id. 
36. See Marc Reynebeau, Political Institutions and the Construction of a Common Public 
Sphere, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE, supra note 10, at 25, 26–27. 
37. Marc Lits, Media in Belgium: Two Separate Public Opinions, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE, 
supra note 10, at 43, 44. 
38. Marc Hooghe & Dave Sinardet, Is There a Belgian Public Opinion?, in IS DEMOCRACY 
VIABLE, supra note 10, at 5, 6; Dave Sinardet, De relatie tussen media, politiek en publiek in de 
Belgische televisieberichtgeving over de andere gemeenschap 8–9 (Dec. 1, 2000) (University of 
Antwerp Political and Social Sciences PSW Paper 2000/9) [hereinafter Sinardet, PSW Paper 2000/9], 
available at http://webhost.ua.ac.be/psw/pswpapers/PSWpaper 2000-09 sinardet.pdf. 
39. See RUDY AERNOUDT, VLAANDEREN–WALLONIË: JE T’AIME, MOI NON PLUS: 
ANTIMANIFEST OVER DE VERHOUDING TUSSEN WALEN EN VLAMINGEN 17–35 (2006) (discussing 
the various stereotypes and their effects on Belgian culture). 
40. See Marleen Brans, Christian de Visscher & Diederik Vancoppenolle, Administrative 
Reform in Belgium: Maintenance or Modernisation?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 979, 992–95 (2006) 
(discussing the evidence on cultural differences between Flanders and Wallonia regarding 
organizational reforms in government). 
41. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 65–66. 
42. Contra Marc Hooghe, Are There Really Two Public Opinions in Belgium?, in IS 
DEMOCRACY VIABLE, supra note 10, at 30, 31 (arguing that public opinion cannot be deduced from 
election results). 
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cultural avant-garde of the 1920s, the dealings with second-wave feminism in 
the 1970s, and the history of the Boy Scouts movement.
43
  These examples all 
seem to reveal rather diverging patterns.  In this view, the differences in 
public opinion and identity are not a result of the institutional structure, but 
vice versa.  It is even asserted that politics in Belgium was one of the last 
domains to be federalized.
44
  From that perspective the question is not so 
much why Flemish and Walloons do not know each other any more, but rather 
whether they have ever known each other.
45
 
To the contrary, others claim that the often-invoked cultural differences 
between Flanders and Wallonia are not that substantial.
46
  Some even feel that 
Flemish and Walloons are closer to each other than the Flemish are to the 
Dutch and the Walloons are to the French.
47
  It has been said that, ―The 
Flemish and the Walloons have everything in common, except the language.  
The Flemish and the Dutch have nothing in common, except the language.‖48  
By and large, it is argued, Belgians are just like other average European 
citizens.
49
  In this view, there is nothing inherently Flemish or Walloon in the 
public opinion. 
The existence of cultural differences, identity differences, or split public 
opinions can be debated.  What cannot be denied, however, is the segregation 
between the north and the south.  The Flemish and Francophone Belgians 
know little about each other, do not read each other’s newspapers, do not 
watch each other’s television, and do not listen to each other’s radio; they do 
not have a common set of cultural references or topics of conversation.
50
  And 
this probably has always been so,
51
 except for a small Flemish elite that spoke 
French fluently.
52
 
 
43. Marnix Beyen, The Duality of Public Opinions as a Democratic Asset: Confessions of an 
Historian, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE, supra note 10, at 20, 20–22. 
44. See infra Part II.E. 
45. Beyen, supra note 43, at 22. 
46. Dave Sinardet, Direct Democracy as a Tool to Shape a United Public Opinion in a 
Multilingual Society? Some Reflections Based on the Belgian Case, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE, 
supra note 10, at 34, 36.  Very often there are merely different sensitivities related to the different 
socio-economical contexts.  That these differences in opinion may grow into community conflicts is 
largely due to the split of the political landscape.  See Sinardet 2006, supra note 35, at 237–47. 
47. Reynebeau, supra note 36, at 28.  The latter part of the reasoning is very doubtful.  Many 
agree that a greater cultural proximity exists between Brussels–Wallonia and France than between 
Flanders and the Netherlands.  For example, fewer than 5% of Flemish watch Dutch television 
channels, whereas more than 30% of Francophone Belgians watch French television channels.  Lits, 
supra note 37, at 45. 
48. van der Kris, supra note 10, at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49. Hooghe, supra note 42, at 31.  
50. Reynebeau, supra note 36, at 28. 
51. See Beyen, supra note 43, at 22. 
52. Reynebeau, supra note 36, at 28. 
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The high degree of residential and workplace segregation in the Flemish 
and Walloon regions is stunning.  Almost all commuting is to Brussels, but 
not to the other regions.
53
  Within Brussels, there is a modest degree of 
residential integration.  The professional integration in the Brussels workplace 
is much higher because numerous Flemish people who live in Flanders 
commute to Brussels for work.
54
  Despite the country’s small size, social 
interaction between the Flemish and Francophone people is extremely limited, 
except in bilingual Brussels.  This may very well be a direct result of the 
language policies of dual monolinguism started in the 1930s. 
Hence, millions of Belgians cannot talk to each other.  At all levels of 
education, up to the university level, the curriculum is typically taught 
exclusively in either French or Dutch.
55
  A symbolic turning point in this 
regard was the split in the magic year 1968 of the University of Leuven into a 
Flemish and an independent Francophone university.
56
  Since the 1988 
constitutional reform, nearly all decisions regarding educational competence 
requirements have devolved to the communities.
57
 
Ten years ago researchers found that in Wallonia, 17% of the population 
knew Dutch in addition to French.
58
  Only 7% were trilingual.
59
  The 
proportion of multilingual Flemish people was much higher: 57% knew 
French and Dutch, and 40% knew English as well.
60
  It should be noted that in 
Flemish secondary education, a course in French is obligatory, while a course 
in Dutch is still not required for students in Wallonia, although most schools 
 
53. The vast majority (about 90%) of all commuting is toward Brussels.  Commuting between 
Flanders and Wallonia is very limited (about 1%).  MANIFESTO, supra note 28, at 63. 
54. Id. at 63; MCRAE, supra note 5, at 76–77. 
55. Except, however, for an increasing number of English courses at universities.  English 
might very well be the common language that could bring the divided Belgian people together.  See 
Alain Verbeke, Op-Ed., BHV? Let’s Do Business!, DE TIJD, May 21, 2008, at 16, and LE SOIR, May 
27, 2008, at 16 (writing in both the leading economic newspaper in Flanders and the leading general 
newspaper in Francophone Belgium).  
56. The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) stayed in the ancient town of Leuven, where the 
university was established in 1425.  The Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) had to move out of 
town into Wallonia where a new town was created, Louvain-la-Neuve.  Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, History of K.U. Leuven, http://www.kuleuven.be/about/history.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2009). 
57. Limited exceptions are the determination of the start and end of mandatory education age, 
minimum conditions for awarding diplomas, and the teachers’ pension regulation.  See Alain 
Verbeke, Unification of Laws in Federal Systems: Belgium, in UNIFICATION OF LAWS IN FEDERAL 
SYSTEMS: GENERAL REPORT (Daniel Halberstam & Mathias W. Reimann eds., forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 7, on file with authors) (originally reported at the First Intermediate Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law on the impact of uniform law on national law, held  
November 13–15, 2008, in Mexico City, Mexico). 
58. Ginsburgh & Weber, supra note 20, at 4. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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in Wallonia offer and promote Dutch classes.  A general impression, however, 
is that younger generations of Flemish speak French much less fluently now.  
Although part of the reason for this is the increasing dominance of English, 
we feel that the ever-growing segregation between Flemish and Walloons may 
also be part of the explanation. 
E.  Political Divide 
The divided character of Belgium—linguistically, culturally, 
economically, and socially—seems to have been present from the very outset.  
History shows an evolution during which the ambition of a central and unified 
Francophone state has been gradually frustrated by the claims of a dominated 
Flemish majority.  It is argued that this ambition to be a modern nation-state 
was ―imbued with contradictions‖61 from the very start.  The extremely liberal 
basis of the constitution inherently weakens the strong central power because 
it implies that social identities have the freedom to develop into autonomous 
forces that may eventually threaten the state itself.
62
 
Because of this strong, unified state ideal, and the benefits it bestowed on 
the Francophone establishment (including a Flemish elite that historically has 
spoken French and allied itself with the Francophone establishment), it is 
hardly surprising that the political institutions were the very last to federalize.  
It was a long and steady process for the political structures to capitulate, with 
the Flemish majority searching for its lingual, cultural, social, and economic 
positions within the political construct.  The process of political federalization 
was started and accepted only out of pure necessity.  This may explain why 
the Belgian constitutional construct is so complicated and feels like 
improvised and hurried patchwork.
63
  It was not a thought-out, consistent 
reform, but a series of ad hoc compromises stitched together over more than 
four decades and five reforms.
64
 
Hence, the long-standing conflict between the Flemish and the 
Francophones has been embedded into a complex federal structure that both 
reflects and reinforces the organization of political, social, and cultural life on 
the basis of language.  It confirms the sense that there are ―two peoples‖ who 
are likely, in time, to drift farther apart and not closer together.  Ordinary 
citizens may participate in the political process only among their own 
language group. 
Today Belgium is a federal country with substantial autonomy for the 
French- and Dutch-language communities and the Walloon and Flemish 
 
61. Beyen, supra note 43, at 23. 
62. See supra Part II.A; Beyen, supra note 43, at 23.  
63. Id. at 23–24. 
64. See Hooghe, supra note 6, at 62–66. 
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regions.
65
  The federal system is not hierarchical: the subunits have exclusive 
legislative and administrative powers within their respective areas of 
competence.  The regions and communities are on equal footing with the 
federal government, subject to the constitution.  It is clear that such horizontal 
federalism encourages autonomous policy making.
66
  Therefore, political life 
in Belgium is mostly conducted along linguistic lines.  For more than thirty 
years, the three major political families—the Christian Democrats, the 
Liberals, and the Socialists—have been split into separate French-speaking 
and Flemish parties.
67
  Parties do not compete across the language lines for 
community and regional elections, except in the Brussels–Capital Region.  
Furthermore, even the federal (or national) elections are, in a sense, regional.  
Indeed, people must vote in geographically defined areas with a choice 
limited to parties of the language of that area.  A citizen living in Flanders can 
vote only for Dutch-speaking parties; and vice versa, someone in the Walloon 
region must choose a French-speaking party.
68
  Politicians chosen for federal 
responsibilities are accountable only to the electorate in their 
community/region and not to the other half of the country. 
At the national level, a variety of mechanisms ensure that neither the 
Flemish nor the Francophone parties, acting on their own, can impose 
decisions on the other language group.  A governing majority in Parliament 
requires a coalition government, which crosses language lines and typically 
includes at least four of the six major parties.
69
  Each deputy in the national 
House of Representatives is elected to a four-year term by proportional 
representation from party lists in geographically defined districts.  The 
deputies are assigned to represent either the French group or the Dutch group, 
 
65. These are technical constitutional concepts.  Regions refer to territories: the Flemish, 
Walloon, and Brussels Regions.  Communities refer to personal matters related to language and 
culture: the Flemish, Francophone, and German Communities.  See Verbeke, supra note 55. 
66. Jan Beyers & Peter Bursens, The European Rescue of the Federal State: How 
Europeanisation Shapes the Belgian State, 29 W. EUR. POL. 1057, 1060 (2006). 
67. As early as the 1930s, the Catholic Christian Democratic Party became divided into two 
linguistic ―wings‖—one Flemish and one French-speaking—over the issue of Flemish cultural 
autonomy.  Later, in 1967, the Christian Democrats formally split into two separate parties as a result 
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depending on the language of the electoral district.
70
  Constitutional 
amendments and certain ―special laws‖ require concurrent majorities from 
each language group, as well as a two-thirds overall majority.  
Representatives also negotiate in the shadow of an ―alarm bell procedure,‖ 
which, although rarely invoked, carries with it the threat that the government 
will fall.  This procedure enables a two-thirds majority of either language 
group to suspend the enactment of any proposed legislation expected to 
adversely affect that language group.  If invoked, the procedure requires that 
the matter be referred to the government for further consideration and 
negotiation.  Unless an acceptable compromise is reached within thirty days, 
the government falls and new elections must be held. 
An important positive note, however, is that the Belgians have managed to 
make this five-decade evolution with practically no bloodshed whatsoever.
71
  
Whatever the future developments may be, history teaches that violence 
remains very unlikely.
72
  Unfortunately, none of these state reforms have 
brought stability to Belgium.  Views on the long-term consequences of 
federalism substantially differ.  On one side is Arend Lijphart, who expects 
federalism to bring about a new balance: besides a loyalty toward their sub-
national region, citizens will also develop a sense of federal loyalty.  Opposed 
to that is the more pessimistic view of Donald Horowitz, who predicts that 
federalism merely functions as a transition phase and must lead to instability. 
Regions awarded autonomy will use these powers and demand ever more 
authority, in the end hollowing out the federal level.
73
 
Since the June 2007 federal elections, the Flemish have called for various 
systemic changes, including more community autonomy and a reduction in 
the ―financial support‖ they give to the Walloons.  For more than two years 
the country has been in a deep institutional crisis.  Months of negotiations in 
the second half of 2007 led nowhere.  In early 2008 an interim government 
with the former Prime Minister was formed, and by Easter a new government 
had taken over.  As of this writing no progress whatsoever has been made 
regarding institutional reforms.  Although the financial and economic crises of 
late 2008 have pushed state reform talks down the priority list of the political 
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agenda, they are issues that remain at the core of the Belgian political scene.  
In the June 2009 regional elections, N-VA, a Flemish nationalist party 
pleading for substantial Flemish autonomy, obtained a grand victory and 
entered into the Flemish government.
74
  This undoubtedly will put the state 
reform back on the table. 
F.  Summary 
The structure of a conflict can be characterized as unstable when the 
affected communities show little overlap.
75
  A conflict develops across the 
fault lines between the two unrelated groups.  According to Pruitt and Kim, a 
community is likely to polarize under these conditions, producing escalation.
76
  
This sort of polarization is exactly what is happening in Belgium, particularly 
since 2007.  The fault line is the ―language border,‖ separating groups with 
strong historical and cultural differences.  The regions differ, in terms of 
landscape, industry, unemployment, and political traditions and 
developments.  The fault lines become stronger and are enlarged by the 
complex structure, in which no national parties and no national media exist.
77
  
This process of de-integration has picked up speed since the 1970s, reducing 
crosscutting bonds. 
III.  MEDIA AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CONFLICT 
A.  Media Divide 
There was a time when Francophone newspapers such as La Libre 
Belgique and Le Soir sold numerous copies in Dutch-speaking Flanders.  
There were even Francophone regional newspapers in Antwerp and at the 
Flemish coast.
78
  The reverse was not true: Dutch newspapers were not sold in 
French-speaking communities.  The reason is obvious: Dutch was of no use to 
the French speakers, and the Flemish elite had to speak French to be part of 
the Belgian establishment.  Indeed, the French-speaking Flemish elite happily 
used this as a means to confirm their superiority to the common Flemish 
people. 
But all of this cross-consumption of media has disappeared.  In 1960, the 
unitary public media institute INR/NIR was split into two autonomous 
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channels: the French-speaking RTBF and the Dutch-speaking BRT.
79
  At the 
outset, RTBF broadcasted programs from France, while BRT broadcasted 
local productions aimed at building and confirming a Flemish identity and 
emancipation from the central Francophone power.  The media split preceded 
the political divide by a decade.  It was only in 1970, with the first 
constitutional reform, that powers regarding culture, information, press, and 
audio-visual media were transferred away from the federal landscape to the 
community level.
80
 
Today Belgian media, as in almost all other areas in Belgian society, 
reveal the phenomenon of the divide between north and south.  No mass 
media whatsoever—newspapers, television stations, or radio stations—aim at 
both the French- and Dutch-speaking communities.
81
  Each community has its 
own public broadcasting organization regulated by its language community, 
not by the national government.
82
  Governance agreements for both public 
channels call for the promotion of the cultural identity of their respective 
language communities.  There is no mention of the promotion of national 
identity or cohesion, as in other federal countries.
83
  The daily newspapers are 
exclusively Dutch, French, or German.
84
  The divide not only characterizes 
public radio and television, but also commercial radio and television stations. 
As mentioned earlier, Flemish do not read Francophone newspapers, do 
not listen to Francophone radio stations, and do not watch Francophone 
television.  Similarly, French speakers do not read or watch Dutch-based 
media.  Within each group’s local media there is almost no reporting of events 
of the other group, completing the segregation.  Flanders and Wallonia are 
unknown and foreign territories to each other.
85
  Only about 3% of the 
Flemish television news is related to topics pertinent to the other language 
community.  By comparison, Francophone channels devote more attention to 
Flanders and are also more federally oriented.
86
  Of the few Francophone 
politicians appearing on Flemish television, 90% are federal officials (with 
virtually no attention paid to the other region or community).
87
  On the 
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Francophone side, more time is awarded to elections, sports, and cultural 
events in France than to such events in Flanders.
88
 
B.  Simplifications and Stereotypes 
We mentioned that people of one community do not read or watch the 
other’s media.  We then saw that, within each community’s own media, there 
is almost no reporting on the other side.  In addition to all of this, when there 
is news showcasing the other community, it is overly simplified by use of 
stereotypes.
89
  The mechanisms used are similar on both sides.
90
  One aspect 
or opinion is a symbol for the entire community.  The focus is on one often-
caricatured feature of each community, while other features are ignored.  The 
Freudian narcissism of the small differences, with the focus on enlarging 
every tiny difference to one of consequential size, is applied very skillfully.  
The image-building is symmetrical, with each community perceiving itself as 
the victim dominated by the other side.  All of this is spiced up with 
metaphors ranging from divorce to war.
91
 
Thus, Flanders is often simplified in the Francophone media into one 
single group of extreme right fascists who want independence from the 
Francophones.  An extreme opinion of one person of a separatist party is 
regularly extended to the entire political class, and from there to the entire 
community.  Statements highlighting the cultural divide are frequently used 
and amplified.  Whatever is incongruent with this bias is often ignored.  The 
same is true in the Flemish media: the Francophones are portrayed as lazy, 
socialist parasites full of scandals and corruption.  The rich  
Brabant-Wallon (politically supporting the liberal Reformist Movement) and 
the agrarian Luxembourg provinces (with a strong Christian Democrat 
tradition) are regularly ignored.  Here, too, sometimes the opinion of one 
politician is extrapolated to the entire Francophone community. 
The simplifications and stereotypes that follow from news biased by the 
community divide may sometimes lead to misinformation.
92
  Obviously, for 
professional media that apply high standards of objectivity and independence, 
this is not acceptable.  One example is when the Flemish Minister-President in 
2006 said he did not need the King’s endorsement to make Flemish decrees.  
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This is an accurate explanation of the constitution; however, a French 
newspaper portrayed the statement as breaking news that the Flemish leader 
had declared he did not need the King.  Such a mischaracterization reinforces 
the stereotype of Flemish separatism. 
C.  Bye Bye Belgium 
On Wednesday, December 13, 2006, at 8:22 p.m., the French-speaking 
Belgian channel RTBF interrupted its regular programs for a special news 
report, reporting one item: ―The Flemish parliament has declared unilaterally 
the independence of Flanders.‖93  A reporter standing in front of the Royal 
Palace announced that King Albert II and his wife, Queen Paola, had left the 
country for Kinshasa, Congo, in a military plane.  Pictures from the Antwerp 
Grand Place followed, where thousands of excited Flemish citizens were 
celebrating.  The President of the Walloon Parliament was filmed as the news 
was brought to him: ―We still have Europe,‖ was his depressed comment.  
Although after thirty minutes the RTBF did put a warning on the screen: 
―Ceci est une fiction (This is fiction),‖ and the journalist on air repeated this 
warning, the program left people in complete confusion.  Surveys indicated 
that 89% of the viewers believed what they had seen for quite a while, and 5% 
continued to believe it despite the warnings.
94
  Only 5% never believed it at 
all.
95
  Some foreign embassies sent worried messages back home.  Thousands 
of ordinary Belgians, 31,368 to be precise, made panicked phone calls.
96
  This 
docu-fiction made the world news: European media outlets and U.S.-based 
CNBC reported on it.
97
 
It is not difficult to see where this docu-fiction comes from.  The whole 
documentary symbolizes a frame of mind, a Francophone phantasma,
98
 using 
a rather surrealistic style.
99
  It is the culmination of decades of simplified and 
stereotyped image-building of Flanders by the French-speaking 
communities.
100
  The Flemish were vehemently opposed to this caricature of 
Flanders.  But, as we have discussed, Flemish media use exactly the same 
strategies in their reporting about the Walloon and Francophone communities.  
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This docu-fiction has made very explicit what is often implicit: that television 
and other media confirm and reinforce identity values based on the focus of 
oneself and intolerance for the other.
101
  These identity values in the two 
Belgian communities both influence and are influenced by political and 
cultural thoughts. 
 
DVD Cover, Bye Bye Belgium (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bye Bye Belgium and the discussions that followed were released on DVD 
by the Walloon public television station RTBF.  The DVD cover depicts a 
reproduction of the painting Pornocrates.  The painting shows a naked and 
blindfolded woman walking a pig.  It was painted in 1896 by Félicien Rops, a 
well-known Belgian artist.
102
  This painting fits well with the absurdism and 
surrealist approach of the docu-fiction, and it symbolizes the cynical view of 
politics often observed in Belgium. 
Philippe Dutilleul, the maker of the documentary, worked on the project 
for more than two years in total secrecy.  Right after the documentary aired, 
there was a live debate with five representatives of the Flemish community 
and five from the Francophone community.  Some but not all of the panel 
members were politicians.  The debate was disappointing.  Rather than a 
dialogue between people trying to listen to each other and develop some 
empathy for each other’s perspective, it was merely a positional verbal fight 
with each person defending his or her own view,
103
 never really listening to 
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the other side.  In terms of negotiation theory, there was no active listening 
whatsoever,
104
 with each panel member listening only to his own voice and 
opinion.  The day after the docu-fiction aired, on December 14, a book 
appeared under the same title.
105
  The book documents many conversations 
with leaders in politics, business, and academia.  Many of these people were 
informed of the plans to make a docu-fiction, solicited for their advice, and 
asked to keep full confidentiality.  All of them complied.  Together with 
Professor Robert Mnookin, who at the time was International Francqui Chair 
at the University of Leuven, Verbeke met with Philippe Dutilleul and his 
assistant.
106
  Mnookin appeared in the docu-fiction as the U.S. expert from 
Harvard Law School and was interviewed in front of the U.S. Capitol in 
Washington, D.C.  Mnookin and Verbeke also wrote a chapter in the book, 
analyzing the Belgian conflict through the apparatus of negotiation theory.
107
 
Based on this first-hand involvement, Verbeke can confirm that in his 
experience the intentions of Dutilleul were genuine.  By interrupting the 
regular primetime programming and showing a report that had some 
credibility,
108
 he clearly aimed at shocking people.  He wanted to break 
through the Francophone audience’s comfort zone in order to create an 
atmosphere of openness and dialogue.  We think the filmmakers fully 
expected the substantial impact of the docu-fiction.  However, we believe that 
they underestimated the amount of negative feedback generated by the film, 
and the film’s contribution to escalation of stereotypes on both sides.  
Intended to create awareness and dialogue, this incident fostered further fears 
and negative sentiments between the Flemish and the Walloons.  Barely six 
months after the film aired, during the June 2007 federal elections, a stalemate 
started that has kept the country hostage for more than two years. 
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D.  Framing and Gatekeeping 
News can never be neutral.
109
  Reality is always looked at through a 
specific perspective.
110
  The same is true for journalists.
111
  They necessarily 
frame news facts in a particular way.  Research indicates that journalists 
commonly use a dual-conflict scenario to frame facts, which necessarily leads 
to simplifications.
112
  Journalists frame the news through the lens of a 
reference scheme that is based on an often implicit consensus of the 
dominating discourse of the moment,
113
 influenced by politics and other 
social, cultural, and ideological organizations.  This dominant frame 
determines how the media looks at reality and the terms of the debate.  
Politics and media influence and reinforce each other in this dominant scheme 
that does not necessarily correspond with public opinion at large.
114
  However, 
public opinion is to some extent a construct of the political elites; maybe not 
top down, but circular, mediated by the intervention of mass media.
115
 
Indeed, as gatekeepers of information, and by constantly publishing 
various survey results, the media determine in a substantial way what is 
embraced by public opinion and what is excluded from it.  As gatekeepers 
they may not decide what people think, but they influence to a large extent 
what people think about.  They set the agenda in a constant interaction with 
the political and public agendas.
116
  Even in a closed partitocracy system like 
Belgium, research has found that mass media has important political agenda-
setting power.
117
  The effects in Belgium are greater on symbolic than on 
substantive policy issues.  Newspapers’ influence is larger than television’s, 
and the effects are different according to the issue types.
118
  
The media’s gatekeeping function not only involves the process of 
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selecting the news that passes through the gates of a news medium, but this 
function also includes all aspects of transferring the message—the means, 
frequency, priority, timing, and format of transfer.  All of this is influenced by 
different levels of gatekeeping, ranging from the individual journalist to the 
type of organization and the communication routine of the organization.
119
  
Public channels are supposed to be more normative, and commercial channels 
more utilitarian.  But in Belgium, with the liberation of the market at the end 
of the 1980s and the reorganization of the public channels in the 1990s, the 
distinction between public and commercial channels is fading away and has 
been since the start of the new millennium.
120
  Only the Francophone public 
channel RTBF remains somewhat faithful to the traditional typology. 
E.  Media Responsibility 
Because of this impact, all mass media bear a responsibility toward 
society.  On the continuum of objectivity and independence, they must 
critically assess their position and function.  They owe a duty of full 
information, including different perspectives and nuances, to the public and to 
democracy in particular.  Putting aside the popular media, who are driven by 
economic ratios and tend to present only faits divers and stories focusing on 
simple or popular topics, the responsibility falls almost entirely on the 
shoulders of public media.  Public media cannot escape the duty to deliver 
hard news and should do so in a multi-perspective, non-radicalized, and non-
caricaturized manner.  Belgian media, embedded in the larger divide of 
society and the political-institutional split, seem to have engaged on the 
slippery slope of advocacy journalism.  Be it Flemish or Francophone media, 
they are biased by the political consensus of their community and primarily 
use the lens of that particular perspective. 
As mentioned, this leads to simplification, stereotypes, and even 
misinformation.  Numerous examples illustrate that the same facts are 
reported diametrically differently in Flemish and Francophone media.  
Conclusions made in Flemish media sometimes dramatically differ from those 
made in Francophone media.  It is stunning to unravel them and to identify the 
interpretations and judgmental biases on both sides and data selected by each 
side to support those conclusions.
121
  In the next section we will elaborate on 
some examples. 
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Moreover, the media reinforce segregation in Belgian society.  Hence the 
media landscape does not offer a true federal political forum.  Political 
debates on federal themes are held only among federal politicians in their 
respective communities.  There is no dialogue with the other communities; 
there is only talk about them.
122
  This contributes to the democratic deficit.  
Indeed, there is a federal level, with still very important powers, and yet there 
is no true federal debate.  Federal politicians remain unaccountable to one or 
the other half of the population.
123
  Politicians cleverly use or abuse this 
situation to their own benefit, holding a different conversation with the media 
of the other side than with the media of their home audience, or even sending 
representatives to the other community’s media to give a more moderate view 
there than that espoused within the politicians’ home market.124 
IV.  HUMOROUS AND SERIOUS MODES:  
A MODEL TO CLASSIFY MEDIA ACTIONS IN CONFLICT 
A.  Surrealism as a Key Element of Belgian Culture 
In this Part we focus on a specific feature of the communication style used 
in the media; that is, the mode in which the media act.  The production of Bye 
Bye Belgium represents to some extent a surrealistic approach to the Belgian 
conflict.  In its form and presentation, this docu-fiction plays with realities.  
Surrealism can be seen as an essential part of Belgian culture.  As Aubert, 
Fraiture, and McGuinness write in their overview of Belgian modern art: 
―[W]ho could imagine a Belgian culture without Symbolism and 
Surrealism?‖125  Surrealism is a movement in art and literature that flourished 
in the 1920s and ’30s.  It is characterized by a fascination with the bizarre, the 
incongruous, and the irrational.
126
  It was closely related to Dadaism.  Both 
Dadaism and surrealism are strongly anti-rationalist and much concerned with 
creating effects that are disturbing or shocking.  But whereas Dadaism is 
essentially nihilist, surrealism is positive in spirit.  Bye Bye Belgium has very 
surrealistic features in its anti-rationalist approach and absurdist 
characteristics.  The image of Rops’s Pornocrates fits within this theme.  
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Though it was painted before surrealism emerged, it shares the same irrational 
and bizarre features. 
Surrealism can be defined as a humorous mode of communication, in 
contrast with a serious mode.
127
  In a serious communication mode, the world 
is approached from a rational and congruent perspective in which clarity and 
objectivity are important.
128
  The assumption here is that we are ―living in a 
coherent world, consistent across different people and situations.‖129  
Sorensen explains: 
 
This is the world based on reason and logic, and 
contradictions are considered problematic, where something 
cannot ―be‖ and ―not be‖ at the same time.  Contradictions 
are treated as failure to communicate properly, and assumed 
to be based on misunderstandings.  In this mode, they have to 
be treated as problematic, otherwise they threaten to 
undermine the perception that we share the same world.
130
 
In a humorous mode incongruity, paradox, and ambiguity play central 
roles.
131
  Contradictions are not problematic, but a necessary feature of the 
humorous mode, where we play with duality, incongruity, and 
misunderstandings.  Humorous communication modes often present things 
upside-down or in different frames simultaneously.
132
  In media, humorous 
communication is presented in many different forms, varying from the classic 
cartoons, to YouTube messages, to documentaries like Bye Bye Belgium.  
Communicating in a humorous mode can serve different functions and can be 
done in different ways, contributing to either conflict escalation or de-
escalation. 
We first discuss different functions and ways of using humor.  We then 
apply both serious and humorous modes of communication to the media 
portrayal of the Belgian conflict. 
B.  Different Functions of Humor 
Humor serves different functions.  These functions can be differentiated 
between internal and external functions.  Internal functions of humor serve the 
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person or group to enhance the self-image, cope with and reduce stress, and 
promote well-being.
133
  The external functions serve to communicate with 
other parties, outsiders, or bystanders, and can contribute to the development 
of a conflict, either in escalating or de-escalating social situations.
134
 
1.  Internal Functions 
There are more than 100 theories on the functions humor serves for the 
individual or group.
135
  These theories have been summarized in three broad 
categories: theories of superiority, relief, and incongruity.
136
 
The theory of superiority is based on our fundamental need for social 
comparison between self and others, and between our own group and other 
groups.
137
  Through social comparison, one recognizes differences and sees 
one’s self and one’s group as superior over another group.  The other party is 
strange and shows weaknesses that we do not have, or have overcome or 
overgrown.  This feeling of superiority is a fundamental need in groups.  An 
important element of the concepts of self and identity is defined by the groups 
to which we belong.  According to the social identity theory, we have a strong 
need to belong to a group that outperforms other groups.
138
  The mere fact that 
groups are defined as ―different‖ facilitates rivalry and conflict.  Humor helps 
to emphasize this feeling of superiority. 
The second function humor can perform is to reduce stress and tension.  
Theories of relief, drawing on psychophysiology, explain that humor helps 
people to regain pleasure, as energy is needed to suppress anxiety, fear, or 
anger.
139
  A simple remark or joke can result in loud laughter, reducing 
tensions.  In this way, humor is an important instrument used to cope with 
stress in many domains, including intergroup and societal conflicts.  As 
conflict is usually a major stressor, both for groups and individuals, humor 
helps to reduce the inner tensions.
140
 
The third function of humor, embodied in incongruity theories, is to cope 
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with conflict through cognitive work.
141
  Reframing situations, focusing on 
incongruities, and highlighting the strange elements or absurdities in a 
situation help to cognitively cope with complex situations.  Drawing attention 
to the incongruities offers people and groups the possibility to redefine their 
reality, including conflicting realities, so as to better cope.  Humor criticizes 
assumptions about a situation, proposing an alternate reality, in an ambiguous 
way. 
2.  External Functions: Four Styles of Use of Humor 
Humor, and particularly humorous communication, serves not only 
internal functions, but also social functions.  The social functions of 
humorous communication can be directed toward the other conflict party, as 
well as to others involved, or they may influence outsiders.  The intention of 
the communication should be differentiated from the effect.  All too often, the 
use of humor, although intended to de-escalate and to bridge, results in 
escalation.  Humor researchers usually differentiate between four styles of 
humor, based on the intention of the user: affiliative humor, self-enhancing 
humor, aggressive humor, and mildly aggressive humor.
142
 
Affiliative humor is used to promote social interaction, reduce 
interpersonal or intergroup tensions, build a relationship by bridging, and seek 
common experiences that can be seen as humorous for both parties.
143
  This 
type of humor can have a constructive function, both in breaking the ice and 
reducing tensions, as well as in agenda-setting.  Drawing attention to a 
conflicting issue in a humorous and playful way is often less threatening than 
addressing the issue in a direct and ―serious‖ mode.144 
Self-enhancing humor is typically used to cope with stressful situations.  
In conflict, self-enhancing humor is used to empower one’s own group, as 
well as to strengthen resilience in coping with the conflict.
145
  This type of 
humor also can be used to strengthen both parties, if they are willing to work 
through the conflict.  It supports a positive attitude, by creating a good mood 
among the parties, and the feeling of ―yes, we can.‖146 
Aggressive humor is related to the previously mentioned interior theory of 
superiority.  Aggressive humor is used to make oneself feel better at the 
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expense of the other party and to gain or maintain status.
147
  Also, aggressive 
humor aims at manipulating others through threat or ridicule.
148
  Sarcasm and 
cynicism are different forms in which aggressive humor can be expressed. 
Mildly aggressive humor is a style in which parties are criticized through 
humor, for example, through irony or teasing.
149
  This style can have positive 
effects, particularly by appealing to and reinforcing shared norms.  The humor 
makes clear what is expected and who can deviate from the norms.  This 
might result in more agreement over what is acceptable.  This can be true both 
within the group, as well as for conflicting groups in society that share the 
same values.
150
  Furthermore, this form of humor might challenge existing 
ideas about reality and provoke parties to look at the conflict in more 
ambiguous ways.  This is a strong feature of Belgian media, who like to 
ridicule the ―in‖ group.  Boasting the self-image is rare in Belgium, therefore, 
surrealism is used in comic strips, television shows, and radio programs to 
deal with the dualities in society. 
C.  Humorous Communication in Conflicts Is Risky Business 
Using humor in conflict communication is a double-edged sword.  Humor 
can facilitate interactions, create an enlightened atmosphere, and challenge 
negative stereotypes of the other group, or a group’s own overly positive 
images.  The use of humor can also contribute to escalation, be it intentional 
or not.  People can easily feel provoked by the use of humor in conflicts, 
particularly in intergroup conflicts.  On the other hand, humor can be a 
deliberate strategy to achieve social change in a nonviolent way.
151
  Media 
often combine serious and humorous modes in dealing with conflicts, and 
such contributions can have either an escalating or de-escalating effect.  The 
Danish Muhammed cartoons have demonstrated this.
152
  According to 
Reuben, constructive coverage of conflicts by media can contribute to better 
communication between parties, and more problem-solving behaviors, when it 
provides reasons for hope, enhances trust, and leverages power between the 
conflicting parties.
153
  Therefore, better communication can be realized 
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through serious and humorous forms of coverage.
154
 
D.  Serious and Humorous Roles of the Media: The Belgian Case 
The different roles media can adopt, both in serious and humorous modes, 
are presented in Table 1.  Theoretically, the concrete dealings of the media 
with a conflict may be classified in one of these quadrants. 
 
Table 1: Roles of Media Contributing to a Conflict 
 
 
Serious Mode Humorous Mode 
Escalating Representing one party Ridiculing one party 
De-escalating Platform for dialogue Adding new frames 
 
The four different forms are illustrated in the Belgium conflict and the 
roles media play in this conflict. 
Escalating through a serious mode can be seen whenever the media report 
in a biased way about the conflict, either by presenting the perspective of one 
party more than the other, giving voice to only one side, or through the 
media’s own comments.  The way incidents are framed also can easily 
contribute to escalation.  In Part III we discussed many characteristics of the 
Belgian media that contribute to this biased presentation.  There is a lack of 
interest in the media for ―the other party.‖  Very often, only acts or behaviors 
that fit the negative stereotypes are presented.  For example, every sign of 
corruption or clientelism in Wallonia receives considerable attention in the 
Flemish press.  Besides this negative stereotyping, the media also emphasize 
differences between the communities, thus contributing to the separate 
identities that characterize a ―conflict group‖ identity.155  A group’s own 
identity is strengthened through the contrast with the other community.  The 
media regularly report ―differences‖ between the Flemish and Walloon 
communities, on all kinds of subjects that are often trivial.  Headlines such as 
―Walloons consult specialists more often than Flemish,‖ ―Less speed limit 
controls on highways in Walloon provinces,‖ and ―More tax inspections in 
Flanders‖ all focus on the differences, and contribute to negative 
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stereotyping.
156
  The media regularly report in terms of community division 
(for example, ―the Flemish front‖ or ―the French-speaking riposte‖), reflecting 
typical intergroup conflict perceptions.
157
  Furthermore, there is active 
framing in terms of the existing conflict.  A clear example is the framing of 
soccer riots.  These happen regularly among different teams in the Belgian 
soccer league; however, they are framed by the Francophone RTBF in terms 
of Flemish aggressors, against ―Walloon‖ supporters, thereby feeding the 
feelings of fear amongst their audience. 
Escalating through a humorous mode is the most classic form that media 
use in conflict.  Propaganda in intergroup conflicts typically uses humorous 
forms to communicate negative images, ridiculing one party to promote the 
feelings of superiority of one’s own group and feeding the fears of the other.  
This is also widespread within the Belgian media.
158
  Two examples may 
illustrate the perspectives.  The first is a cartoon depicting a robber, walking 
away from the reader.  On top is the text: ―The French socialist party ran off 
with a lot of votes.‖  A second picture is a good example of how French-
speaking media feed the fears of the Flemish community.  One mother asks 
the schoolteacher (in French) where her children are. ―They spoke French‖ is 
the answer (in Dutch), as two punished kids are shown in the background.
159
 
The Bye Bye Belgium case
160
 also can be qualified as escalating through a 
humorous mode.  The intentions were aimed at creating shock and 
contributing to dialogue, but the effects clearly escalated the conflict.  Though 
unintended, this program fed anxiety on the French-speaking side and 
irritations on the Dutch-speaking side.  A constructive dialogue did not 
emerge from this program. 
One might question what precise form was used here: humorous, serious, 
or both?  As we already pointed out, in our view the maker of the docu-fiction 
identified rather strongly with the fears of the French-speaking community.  
Therefore, what may appear as a program in a ―humorous‖ and absurdist 
mode is in fact based on serious feelings and thoughts.  The Francophone 
audience, too, building on many years of stereotypes, largely perceived the 
docu-fiction to be a serious mode.  There may have been a mismatch in the 
subjective perspective of a serious mode mixed with the objective frame of a 
more humorous mode.  This incongruity might explain, to some extent, why 
the film’s effects did not contribute to mutual respect and understanding but 
instead escalated the conflict. 
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Analyzing Bye Bye Belgium from the perspective of functions and styles 
of humor, we see that this form might meet a superiority need.  Not in a sense 
of the most powerful, but rather expressing the feeling of a group that feels 
morally right.  The Flemish are pictured as a disloyal group that shows no 
respect for the federal constitution, whereas the Walloons are the evident 
victims in the scenario.  This was perceived by the Flemish as a ―bad joke,‖ 
an aggressive and insulting form of humor. 
Another internal function of humor is, as mentioned, stress relief.  In this 
case, the intention was apparently not to reduce stress, but to increase it, 
though the level of added stress might have been underestimated.  The stress 
level could have been positively influenced by the film’s emphasis on its 
absurdist features, and by the inclusion of more affiliative and self-enhancing 
humor, empowering both groups.  Bye Bye Belgium could have contributed to 
the realization of ambivalent and dualistic reality through playing with 
incongruities.  But, by excessively playing on fears, and taking the scenario 
too seriously, we feel that the film has somewhat missed this potential.  
Though it might appear that the King and Queen fleeing the country into 
Africa is absurd enough, many people actually believed the story.  Here, the 
filmmakers could have better utilized the cornerstones of surrealism, as we 
will discuss in our final paragraphs. 
The Belgian media have undertaken several attempts to contribute to de-
escalating through a serious mode.  Acknowledging that the majority of the 
Belgian population speaks Dutch, in March 2009 the Walloon parliament 
unanimously agreed to replace voice-over dubbing with subtitling when 
Dutch-speaking people are interviewed for French-speaking state television.
161
  
This decision represents a symbolic gesture, and it also helps signal to the 
French-speaking community the importance of the Dutch language within 
Belgium. 
The daily newspapers Le Soir and De Standaard tried several common 
operations, aimed at achieving a better understanding of each other and 
contributing to a shared Belgian identity.  The newspapers sent journalists for 
one month to survey each other’s area, reporting on their observations.162  
Going one step further, the newspapers exchanged journalists to work 
temporarily with each other’s media.  The two newspapers also organized 
several common public debates in both languages, aiming to bridge the points 
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of view considered to be so distant.  These efforts represent attempts by the 
media to play their part as citizens, inflect the separatist speeches, and cause a 
shared national conscience to emerge. 
These attempts were embedded in a national strategy to strengthen a 
national identity.  At the start of 2007, the editors in chief of the two 
newspapers had a meeting with King Albert II.  The intentions were clearly 
aimed at bridging and building more understanding and dialogue. 
However, it appeared difficult to conduct these ―cross-border‖ activities 
without reinforcing feelings of irreconcilable differences.  For example, 
journalists working in each other’s region sometimes used a tone as if they 
were sent to remote and dangerous regions.
163
  Also, the presentation of joint 
activities differed considerably.  For example, both newspapers had a double 
interview with Flemish singer An Pierlé and French-speaking rapper Baloji.  
Analyzing the presentation of the interviews in both newspapers shows 
remarkable differences.  Baloji is asked if he thinks there are fewer contacts 
nowadays between Walloon and Flemish Belgians.  In Le Soir his answer is 
―yes,‖ whereas in De Standaard his answer is ―no.‖164 
Using a humorous mode to de-escalate conflict in the media can be done 
in different ways.  For example, humor can contribute to a better 
understanding of cultural differences.  The exchange of journalists and 
cooperation between newspapers is an easy basis for humorous reflections on 
differences between the communities, and for mirroring.  In January 2009, a 
Walloon reporter, Christophe Deborsu, received training in cross-country 
cycling.  Though it is one of the most popular sports in Flanders, it is almost 
unknown in Wallonia.  Deborsu presented his training in a humoristic way, 
while challenging the self-image of the Walloon.
165
 
The recent Belga-vox initiative aims to contribute to a shared national 
identity, with media playing an important role.  On May 17, 2009, the Belga-
vox concert was held in Brussels: a free concert with many 
well-known local and international artists. The concert was the start of a 
program that aims to promote solidarity, dialogue, respect, cohesiveness, and 
multicultural diversity in Belgium.  Among the organizers are also several 
national media organizations.  This form can be classified as serious, given 
the clear rationality of the initiative.  The potential exists for these initiatives 
to take different creative forms, fitting a more humorous mode. 
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E.  Metaphors in the Media of the Belgian Conflict 
In communication about conflicts, metaphors are often used by media to 
simplify realities, construct meaning, and influence emotions.  Our 
classification model can also help in ordering metaphors that are used to 
describe the conflict, initiatives within the conflict, and the probable 
outcomes.  The metaphors can communicate either a serious or humorous 
mode, and either an escalating or de-escalating view on the conflict.  
Analyzing the different metaphors offers another approach to understanding 
whether the media cover a conflict in escalating or 
de-escalating terms, and whether they contribute in a constructive or 
destructive way. 
Metaphors have been used in the most destructive ways, describing parties 
as non-human ―cockroaches‖ or evil.  However, metaphors can also 
communicate hope: ―we see light on the horizon‖ or ―at the end of the 
tunnel.‖  Current use of metaphors in the Belgian media, whether more 
serious or humorous, generally seems to escalate the conflict.
166
  The 
metaphors clearly represent a rather pessimistic, cynical, or surrealistic 
approach to the conflict (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Metaphors in the Media 
 
 Serious Mode Humorous Mode 
Escalating 
Divorce 
War, time bomb 
Reanimating a dead patient 
The orchestra playing on the 
Titanic (federal 
government) 
A praline divorce 
Varied menu, no fat fish or 
big steak 
Bad slapstick comedy 
Kafka 
Jack Bauer in 24 
De-escalating ??? ??? 
 
Metaphors that are often used in the media to represent the current 
developments in Belgium at the federal level are divorce, war, and a time 
bomb.  Also, clearly pessimistic images include ―the government tries to 
reanimate a dead patient‖ and ―the government acts like the orchestra on the 
Titanic; it plays on while the ship sinks.‖  More humorous metaphors refer to 
a bad slapstick comedy and restaurants where no clear menu is served. 
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Constructive coverage of conflicts,
167
 including metaphors, is possible 
when hope is fostered, power differences are reduced, and trust is enhanced.  
We have not found metaphors in the Belgian media that contribute to these 
elements.  We could not find metaphors expressing de-escalating tendencies, 
or an optimistic image of Belgium as an integrated nation with a clear 
identity.  On the contrary, the metaphors reflect a rather pessimistic view on 
the future.  The most optimistic view is probably that the situation is hopeless, 
but not too serious.  Typical responses given by Flemish people when 
interviewed by international media on the constitutional crisis are that they do 
not have time to answer the question because they have to eat their French 
fries, or that they do not care about the crisis, as there is always some 
government left, if another one is in crisis.
168
 
V.  TOWARD DE-ESCALATION 
Belgian media are an inherent part of the country’s basic divide between 
North and South and also contribute to this divide.  We have concluded that 
the media have on many occasions become players in the game and have 
crossed the tricky lines of advocacy journalism.  Most of the communication 
contributes to conflict escalation.  Both in serious and humorous modes, 
stereotypes are reinforced.  The metaphors that are used express pessimism 
and feed the conflict.  Hence, some press coverage of the Belgian conflict has 
been destructive, to use the framework of Richard Reuben. 
Nevertheless, there have been several constructive initiatives taken by 
media on both sides to create empathy and mutual respect.
169
  They have done 
this either through a serious mode (promoting knowledge of each other, 
organizing and facilitating debates and dialogues, or promoting a shared 
identity), through humorous modes (challenging stereotypes or producing a 
docu-fiction), or a combination of both (such as concerts and cultural events).  
Their impact has, however, remained very limited.  It is clear that genuine de-
escalating intentions by no means guarantee social change in the direction that 
the media, producers, and journalists seek. 
We believe that our classification model is not only a useful means by 
which to examine media action—offering a quadrant model through which 
different media actions can be broadly viewed and systematically analyzed—
it also may be a preparatory tool in exploring how to act, communicate, and 
cover conflict in the future. 
The media in general and individual journalists should first question 
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themselves and critically reflect on their position in society at large and in a 
conflict in particular.  Our quadrant model may be helpful in structuring such 
reflection.  When preparing an article, interview, radio or television news 
item, or documentary, the journalist can review his draft through the lens of 
our model.  If the upper left or right quadrant colors heavily, he should step 
back and rethink the article, because he might be engaging in an escalating 
mode.  A clear challenge for the media, in the Belgian case and perhaps for 
many other cases as well, is to try to minimize these escalating 
communications.  The Belgian case illustrates the complexities and 
difficulties in achieving this, given that media have their own audience, 
usually limited to only one of the conflicting parties.  We accept that media 
can never play a truly neutral role.  But we plead for a more conscious and 
self-reflective attitude, with which the media transparently acknowledge their 
own positions, reference schemes, and perspectives, and use that information 
to try to create constructive and de-escalating coverage of conflict. 
This path is never easy.  This, too, is taught by the Belgian case.  Even 
with the best intentions, journalists are caught in their old frames, thus 
reinforcing stereotypes. 
But the situation is not black or white.  We have seen brave attempts, both 
in a serious and a humorous mode, to walk on the path of constructive and de-
escalating conflict coverage.  The attempts have been made through 
cooperation between media, including journalist exchanges, ―human interest‖ 
stories, joint productions between representatives of both conflicting groups, 
and promotion of boundary-crossing role models, such as artists, pop stars, 
and athletes. 
To us, it seems very much worthwhile to further explore these 
constructive initiatives.  We should support media that are willing to set up 
these experiments with expertise, skill, and, perhaps, coaching.  As conflict 
scholars are very well aware, considering perspectives from two or more sides 
in a conflict is challenging and almost impossible when one is personally 
involved.  Cooperation with conflict scholars and practitioners indeed might 
be helpful, both in the design of constructive initiatives and in developing 
attitudes and competencies, as well as in providing concrete support and 
advice on the job.
170
 
Whether one is working through a serious or a humorous mode, the 
essence is to focus on de-escalation.  At the core of de-escalation is the 
creation of hope and enhancement of trust, mutual understanding, and respect.  
This is the best argument against radicalization and reasoning on the basis of 
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exclusiveness.  If one comes to understand that the world has many faces, that 
all stories have value, and that the situation or conflict is never 
unidimensional but carries in itself an inherent doubleness or multiplicity, 
then de-escalation would follow naturally.  Coping with this doubleness, 
managing it as a permanent tension of life that cannot and should not 
disappear, is a skill we believe that Belgium should be familiar with. 
Indeed, a typical characteristic of Belgian culture and art might bring hope 
for the Belgian conflict.  In Belgian art, a quest for self-determination is 
expressed, seeking ―a resolution of its own doubleness that does not entail the 
erasure of that doubleness.‖171  This quest is not accompanied by uncertainty 
or agonizing discomfort; in fact, the opposite is true.
172
  In Belgian art, 
particularly surrealistic forms, the artists use the complexities and paradoxes 
to create new and hybrid forms.  Such an approach might inspire the media to 
cover the community conflicts creatively and in de-escalating ways. 
We therefore hope and plead for more humor in media coverage of 
conflicts.  Dealing with conflict in a humorous mode can contribute to social 
changes in a nonviolent way, as has been demonstrated in several 
situations.
173
  Our wish for the Belgian media is that they may explore 
intensively and self-critically the use of a humorous and de-escalating mode 
to approach the Belgian conflict, and that they may contribute to the creation 
of many options and possibilities for a more positive climate and transcend 
long-defined fault lines.  A humorous mode in approaching conflict may help 
the Belgian media consider new perspectives and create new frames for 
looking at enduring tangible relations. 
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